Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Fiduciary Duties in Loan Transactions by Piper, William S.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 9
Issue 3 Spring 1978, Fiduciary Responsibilities
Symposium
Article 10
1978
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Fiduciary
Duties in Loan Transactions
William S. Piper
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William S. Piper, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Fiduciary Duties in Loan Transactions, 9 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 708 (2015).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol9/iss3/10
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Fiduciary Duties
in Loan Transactions
INTRODUCTION
An employee stock ownership plan' (ESOP) is a qualified ' stock
bonus plan3 or stock bonus and money purchase plan' designed to
invest employee earnings and employer contributions primarily in
qualifing employer securities.'
An ESOP usually obtains a loan from an unrelated lender.' A
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406 §
2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7), 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
2. I.R.C. § 401(a) establishes a number of benefit plan requirements that must be met to
gain qualification for special tax treatment.
3. In a stock bonus plan benefits are distributed to the participant in the form of securities
of the employer and employer contributions are not necessarily dependent on the existence
of profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2)(iii), (b)(1)(iii)(1956).
4. A money purchase plan is a defined contribution plan as opposed to a defined benefit
plan. It must provide a definite formula for allocating contributions to the individual ac-
counts of the participants. The amount of each participant's ultimate benefits is a function
of earnings gained and losses suffered from the investment of the employer contribution.
Kaplan & Cowan, (ERISA)-Employee Stock Ownership Plans-Qualification, 317 T.M. A-
3 (1977); see also Rev. Rul. 74-340, 1974-2 C.B. 128.
5. "Qualifying employer securities" is defined as securities which are either stock or
another marketable obligation. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-12(a), 42 Fed. Reg. 44389, 44394 (1977).
"Marketable obligation" is further defined as a bond, debenture, note or certificate, or other
eivdence of indebtedness. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.407d-5(b), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44388 (1977).
6. An important characteristic of an ESOP is leveraging-the use of borrowed funds as
opposed to immediate employer contributions to purchase the securities in question. The
following models provided by the Profit Sharing Research Foundation best illustrate and
distinguish the ESOP loan and purchase transaction from the traditional method of corporate
financing.
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party-in-interest, often the employer, guarantees the loan. The
employer's guarantee is accompanied by a promise to make certain
contributions to the ESOP. The loan proceeds are then used to
purchase the securities of the employer and the employer contribu-
tions and stock dividends are applied to retire the loan.
ESOPs are seen as a way to secure corporate capital for greater
economic growth7 while permitting ownership of capital by average
While the term ESOP has been used broadly to cover a variety of plans, it technically applies
to only those transactions where the purchase of securities is "leveraged" with a loan. See
text accompanying notes 22 through 26 infra.
7. See generally S. REP. No. 93-1,298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 155-60 (1974), reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7186, 7294-99 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
93-1298]; C. SCHARF, GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (1976) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as SCHARF]; Knight, ESOPs Offer Employee Benefits, Corporate Financing and
Control, Estate Planning, 52 J. TAX. 258 (1975).
MODEL I I
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP FINANCING
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employees, thereby securing their financial future.8
In the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741
(ERISA), Congress continued the previously established policy of
encouraging the use of ESOPs to provide retirement benefits. 0 In
addition, ERISA maintains the significant tax advantages afforded
the benefit plan, the employer, and the employee to encourage the
use of ESOPs." However, the statute also imposes significant fidu-
ciary duties 2 upon plan trustees. 3 Unless exempted, 4 the fiduciary
and plan may not engage in certain prohibited transactions. 5
Loans to an ESOP are eligible for an exemption in this regard."
The Department of Labor" and the Treasury Department" have
8. See generally S. REP. No. 93-1298, supra note 7, at 155-60; Note, Employee Stock
Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 55 B.U. L. REv. 195 (1975). Senator
Russell B. Long was quoted as saying, "This is an idea whose time has come. Every person
on the payroll should have a piece of the corporate pie." O'Hara & Crawford, Will Every
Corporation Have an ESOP? Senator Long Makes It Hard to Say No, 61 A.B.A.J. 1366, 1366
(1975).
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
10. Congress' intent concerning ESOPs was subsequently expressed more clearly in §
803(h) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976:
The Congress. . . has made clear its interest in encouraging employee stock owner-
ship plans as a bold and innovative method of strengthening the free private enter-
prise system which will solve the dual problems of securing capital funds for neces-
sary capital growth and of bringing about stock ownership by all corporate employ-
ees.
90 Stat. 1520, 1590. Other legislation in which ESOPs received congressional approval in-
clude: The Regional Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973, 45 U.S.C. § § 701-94 (Supp. V 1975);
The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp. V 1975); The Tax Reduction Act of
1975, § 301 (d); I.R.C. § 46 note.
11. Under I.R.C. § 404(a)(3), if the ESOP consists solely of a stock bonus plan and, under
I.R.C. § 404(a)(7), if the ESOP consists of a stock bonus plan and a money purchase plan,
the employer is granted a limited tax deduction for contributions to an ESOP. Participants
are not taxed on contributions or benefits until the benefits are distributed or made available
to them. If the distribution is in lump sum, special tax treatment is afforded by I.R.C. §§
402(a)(2), (e). For a discussion of the federal income tax aspects of ESOPs, see Note,
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 55 B.U. L. REv.
195, 206-10 (1975).
12. See text accompanying notes 28 through 56 infra.
13. The trustee is but one fiduciary of a plan. Other individuals subject to fiduciary duties
may include the plan administrator, the investment manager, and others identified as a
fiduciary by the employer and/or employee organization. ERISA, § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(21) (Supp. V 1975).
14. ERISA, § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(d).
15. See text accompanying notes 36 through 47 infra.
16. ERISA, § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003 (d), I.R.C.
§ 4975(d)(3).
17. Title I of ERISA (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144) contains the sections establish-
ing employee benefit rights administered by the Secretary of Labor.
18. Title II of ERISA (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) contains amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code.
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overlapping jurisdiction concerning ESOPs.'9 Both agencies issued
proposed regulations on July 30, 1976 which addressed the scope of
ERISA's prohibited transaction exemption for loans to ESOPs. To
effectuate the requirement that the loan be for the primary benefit
of the plan's participants and beneficiaries, 0 those regulations
established guidelines regarding the use of loan collateral and its
release from encumbrance, the possibility of default, the use of loan
proceeds, the type of stock which may be acquired, the availability
of put option rights, the necessity of rights of first refusal, and the
method of valuation.
The proposed regulations evoked extensive public criticism re-
garding the their complexity and rigidity. For example, during the
course of establishing the investment credit for contributions to
ESOPs provided in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress stated:
"[T]he proposed regulations . . . may make it virtually impossible
for ESOP's, and especially leveraged ESOP's, to be established and
function effectively."'" Leverage refers to an ESOP's immediate
acquisition of employer securities through debt financing as op-
posed to a gradual purchase of the stock with annual contributions2
to the trust. 3 The employer's contributions are used by the ESOP
to retire the loan.24 Additionally, the participants benefit from the
19. ERISA, § 3003, 29 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. V 1975), requires consultation between the
Department of Labor and Treasury with respect to the provisions relating to prohibited
transactions. ERISA, § 3004, 29 U.S.C. § 1204 (Supp. V 1975), permits the departments to
develop rules and regulations which will minimize the burden of complying with conflicting
or overlapping requirements. The Senate Finance Committee has recently recommended
passage of S. 2352 which would allocate jurisdiction between the two departments over
administrative functions presently shared by both under ERISA. The Department of Labor
would have administrative responsibility in cases involving prohibited self-dealing or fidu-
ciary misconduct. Other cases involving other ERISA standards will be handled by the
Treasury Department. S. REP. No. 95-613, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
20. ERISA, § 408(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003 (a),
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3)(A).
21. CONFERENCE REPORT No. 94-1515 on H.R. REP. No. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Seass. 539
(1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4118, 4235, [hereinafter cited as
CONFERENCE REPORT No. 94-1515]. In § 803(h) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress went
on record as being
deeply concerned that the objectives sought by . . .[a] series of laws will be made
unattainable by regulations and rulings which treat employee stock ownership
plans as conventional retirement plans, which reduce the freedom of the employee
trusts and employers to take the necessary steps to implement the plans, and which
otherwise block the establishment and success of these plans.
90 Stat. 1520, 1590 (1976).
22. The term "annual contributions" as used herein refers to the contribution the em-
ployer makes to the trust under the plan documents. It may consist of either cash or securi-
ties.
23. See Note, Recent Developments in Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 16 WASHBURN
L.J. 709, 723 (1977); see also SCHARF, supra note 7, at 72.
24. The annual contribution is generally required of the employer by the lender as a
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amount, if any, that the stock appreciates in excess of the interest
rate of the loan.2" With a leveraged ESOP, the corporation receives
the benefit of increased cash flow-an immediate substantial infu-
sion of the capital represented by the loan proceed.26 it was believed
that the proposed regulations jeopardized those benefits by impos-
ing severe restrictions. 7
In response, the Department of Labor and the Treasury Depart-
ment issued final regulations on September 2, 1977 which addressed
these objections. Broadly speaking, the regulations expand the
scope of the loan exemption, permit an ESOP to acquire securities
subject to an employer's right of first refusal, and clarify the
"primary benefit" requirement. In effect, the regulations accord the
trustee greater flexibility in fulfilling his fiduciary duties and permit
features considered essential by employers, while preserving the fi-
duciary's required standard of performance.
This article examines the character and effect of the proposed
ESOP regulations and the criticisms they evoked. In addition, the
article explores the responses of the Department of Labor and the
Treasury Department as reflected in the final regulations. Finally,
the discussion includes an analysis of the likely effect of the new
regulations. It will be helpful, initially, to review the general limita-
tions which ERISA establishes for activities in connection with
employee benefit plans.
THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
ERISA imposes specific affirmative duties within the general re-
quirement that the fiduciary2 "discharge his duties with respect to
a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries."
First, he must act exclusively to provide benefits to participants and
their beneficiariesl and to defray reasonable administrative expen-
ses. Second, the fiduciary must administer the plan as a "prudent
man" 30 would. Third, the fiduciary must diversify3' the investments
condition to providing the loan. SCHARF, supra note 7, at 36.
25. Even in the event the stock does not appreciate in value, the employee will still receive
upon distribution the security allocated to his account. See SCHARF, supra note 7, at 36-38.
26. Id. at 73-74.
27. See note 21 supra.
28. A fiduciary in this regard is one who has discretionary authority or control over the
management as well as responsibility in the administration of the plan and disposition of the
assets. The definition is intended to include paid investment advisors. ERISA, § 3(21), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21) (Supp. V 1975).
29. ERISA, § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
30. Id. § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975). This retains the pre-
ERISA rule as stated in Rev. Rul. 69-421 pt. 2 § (k)(1), 1969-2 C.B. 59.
31. ERISA, § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
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unless doing so is clearly imprudent under the circumstances.',
However, an ESOP33 fiduciary is exempt from the latter two require-
ments insofar as they require diversification. 4 Fourth, the fiduciary
must discharge his duties in accordance with the terms of the docu-
ments governing the plan."
In addition, section 406 of ERISA3I forbids a party-in-interest37
from engaging in certain practices which he knows or should know
directly or indirectly constitute "prohibited transactions," unless an
exemption applies. 8 Transactions between a plan and a party-in-
interest that are prohibited include: (1) a sale, exchange, or lease
of property; 9 (2) an extension of credit;40 (3) a provision of goods,
services, or facilities;4' and (4) a use of plan assets by or for the
benefit of a party-in-interest.4 2 Further, a fiduciary generally may
not: (1) deal with the plan assets in his own interest;43 (2) act in any
transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party whose interests
are adverse to those of the plan, the participants or the beneficiar-
ies;" or (3) receive any consideration for this personal account from
any party dealing with such plan. 5 Finally, only qualifying em-
ployer securities or real property"0 may be acquired on behalf of an
32. Id.
33. Other individual account plans also qualify for the exemption from diversification.
See ERISA, § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (Supp. V 1975).
34. ERISA, § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
35. Id. § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (Supp. V 1975).
37. The term "party-in-interest" as defined in ERISA, § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (14)
(Supp. V 1975), includes: (1) any fiduciary, counsel, or employee of the plan; (2) a person
providing services to the plan; (3) an employer of employees covered by the plan; and (4) a
50% owner of an employer. "Disqualified person" under the I.R.C. has a similar meaning.
ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2).
38. In addition to the loan exemption herein discussed, the prohibitions stated in ERISA,
§§ 406-407, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106-07 (Supp. V 1975), do not apply to the acquisition, sale or lease
of qualifying employers securities or real property if it is made to an individual account plan
for adequate consideration and no commission is charged. Id. § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e)
(Supp. V 1975). Adequate consideration therefore requires a proper valuation of the assets to
be acquired. See text accompanying notes 162-63 infra.
39. ERISA, § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975). ERISA, §§ 2003(a),
(b), I.R.C. §§ 4975 (a), (b) impose a tax on each of the prohibited transactions. See note 162
infra.
40. ERISA, § 406(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
41. Id. § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C).
42. Id. § 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D).
43. Id. § 406(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1).
44. Id. § 406(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2).
45. Id. § 406(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).
46. Employer real property refers to real property and related personal property that is
leased to the employer or affiliate by the plan. ERISA, § 407(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(2)
(Supp. V 1975). To qualify, the parcels of property must be dispersed geographically and be
suitable for multiple purposes. Id. § 407(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(4).
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ESOP.47
In order to leverage an ESOP, both a purchase exemption and a
loan exemption are required. Section 408(e) 48 provides the exemp-
tion for purchases and sales of employer securities and real property
to a party-in-interest." Section 408(b)(3)10 exempts loans to ESOPs
by a party-in-interest from the prohibitions established in section
406.11 However, the loan must be primarily for the benefit of partici-
pants and beneficiaries,52 and the interest rate must be reasonable. 53
Further, a party-in-interest may only receive as collateral qualifying
employer securities.54 Since the ultimate purpose of the loan is to
acquire employer securities or real property, the fiduciary must bear
in mind that such asset acquisitions are still prohibited by sections
406 and 407 of the Act 55 unless "adequate consideration" is given or
received and- other requirements are met.5"
Availability of the ESOP loan exemption is conditioned upon the
existence of an employee stock ownership plan formally designated
as such in a plan document that also states that the plan is designed
to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities. 7 A fiduciary
of a plan which disregards the statutory58 definition of an ESOP will
not be protected by the ESOP loan transaction exemption. The plan
also must comply with regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury.5 9
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The final Treasury and Labor regulations must be evaluated in
47. Id. § 406(a)(1)(E), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(E).
48. Id. § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e) (Supp. V 1975).
49. See text accompanying notes 159-67 infra.
50. ERISA, § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C.
§ 4975(d)(3).
51. See text accompanying notes 39 through 45 supra.
52. ERISA, § 408(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a),
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3)(A).
53. Id. § 408(b)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a),
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3)(B).
54. Id.
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106-07 (Supp. V 1975).
56. ERISA, § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e) (Supp. V 1975). Failure to give or receive
adequate consideration will initially subject a disqualified party to an excise tax of 5% of the
amount involved for each prohibited transaction and may result in a rescission of the transac-
tion. I.R.C. § 4975(a). See notes 159-67 infra and accompanying text.
57. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(14), 42 Fed. Reg 44389, 44393 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(n), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44387 (1977).
58. ERISA, § 407(d)(6)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a),
I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7)(A).
59. Id. § 407(d)(6)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a),
I.R.C. § 4975 (e)(7)(B).
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light of employers' current and pre-ERISA practices and objectives
with respect to ESOPs. The purposes for which employers have used
ESOPs include:10 to provide long-term security and retirement ben-
efits for participants;" to provide an alternate means of corporate
finance and to ease a temporary corporate cash-flow squeeze;62 to
plan for the retirement or death of a major shareholder or key em-
ployee; 3 and to increase employee incentive.64 The investment
objectives of the plan are formulated in light of the purposes moti-
vating the employer to adopt an ESOP.
The ultimate investment objective is to maximize the value of the
trust. The employer's purposes may determine the relative weight
to be accorded that objective relative to other specific objectives.65
For example, the principal of the trust may be jeopardized where
the ESOP is adopted merely to provide an alternate means of corpo-
rate finance and alleviate cash flow problems. This danger is
countered by the investment practice of paying closer attention to
the value of the employer securities held by the plan. Alterna-
tively, the goal of providing maximum benefits to a key employee
may require that the plan maximize its potential for gain through
high risk investments. The increased risk involved in this objective
is contrary to the goal of maintaining the safety of principal. How-
ever, given a successful corporation, primary investments in the em-
ployer's securities may provide the greatest potential for gain and
achieve tertiary purposes of the plan as well. Furthermore, where
the overriding consideration of the plan is to provide retirement
benefits for employees, the investment objective of the plan must
60. ESOPs have been implemented for a number of reasons. For an overview of these
reasons, see the survey reported in STAFF OF HEwrrr ASSOCIATES FOR THE PROFIT SHARING
COUNCIL OF AMERICA, ESOPs: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 52 [hereinafter cited as ESOPs
REPORT]; see also B. METZGER, PROFIT SHARING IN 38 LARGE COMPANIES 13 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as PROFIT SHARING]; SCHARF, supra note 7, at 23.
61. This purpose for adopting an ESOP coincides with the primary benefit requirement
imposed on fiduciaries of the plan. See text accompanying notes 87-98 infra.
62. This purpose should not be the sole objective in the administration of the plan. A plan
administered for the primary benefit of the employer may result in disqualification. See
authority cited in note 88 infra.
63. An ESOP may provide a shareholder with a market for his securities. At the time of
retirement, participants may be financially secured upon the distribution and eventual sale
of securities held in their account.
64. The incentive that an ESOP gives the employee may in turn provide greater profits
for all shareholders through increased productivity.
65. Hoogstraat, An Investment Policy for Profit Sharing Trusts, reprinted in B. METZGER,
INVESTMENT PRACTICES, PERFORMANCE,'AND MANAGEMENT OF PROFIT SHARING TRUST FUNDS 499,
500 (1969) [hereinafter cited as METZGER].
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., M'TZGER, supra note 65, at 323.
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counteract the effect of increased cost of living and inflation. "8 This
objective is reflected in the practice of combining investment in
equity69 with fixed income securities. 0
SCOPE OF THE LOAN EXEMPTION
ERISA section 406(b)(1) and (2)"' considered alone would bar a
fiduciary who is also a party-in-interest, e.g., employer or trustee-
lender, from arranging or participating in the loan transaction. The
proposed regulations severely restricted the scope of the section 408
(b)(3)72 prohibited transaction7" exemption by requiring that an
independent fiduciary arrange a loan transaction involving the em-
ployer or another interested party. Specifically, the proposed regu-
lations74 interpreted section 408(b)(3) as exempting ESOPs from the
prohibited transactions contained in section 406 (a),75 but not from
the ban on fiduciary self-dealing found in section 406(b).
The independent fiduciary requirement was criticized heavily by
Congress7" and the public.77 Normally, an ESOP's ability to obtain
and repay a loan is dependent upon the employer's financial condi-
tion, since the employer's guarantee becomes the lender's primary
assurance of repayment. As one senator recognized: "No corporation
would be willing to grant authority for an independent party to
negotiate terms of an ESOP loan for which its guarantee is neces-
sary. To do so would be a breach of the management's responsibility
to the shareholders of the corporation."7 The Congressional Confer-
ence Report regarding the Tax Reform Act of 1976 asserted that the
proposed independent fiduciary requirement was unreasonable and
unduly burdensome.7" It was thought that adequate protection was
afforded by other regulations and fiduciary duties, such as the pri-
68. Id. at 225.
69. Equity investments may grow in value, and include investments in the various types
of company stock. They perhaps keep pace with increases in the cost of living. Id.
70. Fixed income securities include investments in U.S. government securities, corporate
bonds, mortgages, real estate, employee loans and insurance. They are designed to keep pace
with inflation. Id.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1)(2) (Supp. V 1975). See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
72. Id. § 1108(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3).
73. ERISA, § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C. 4975(c).
74. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(1)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31834 (1976); Prop. Labor
Reg. § 2550.408b-3(a)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31871 (1976).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(c).
76. CONFERENCE REPORT No. 94-1515, supra note 21, at 539.
77. [1976] 4 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,133.
78. 122 CONG. REc. S13429, S13430 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (critique submitted for the
record by Sen. Stevens criticizing the proposed regulations).
79. CONFERENCE REPORT No. 94-1515, supra note 21, at 539.
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mary benefit requirement and the interest rate and collateral limi-
tationsso
The final regulations8' apply the section 408 (b)(3) exemption not
only to subsection 406 (a), but also to subsections 406 (b)(1), relat-
ing to fiduciary dealing with the assets of a plan in its own account,
and 406 (b)(2), concerning fiduciary actions in any transaction in-
volving a plan on behalf of a party whose interests are adverse to
the interests of the plan, the participants, or the beneficiaries. How-
ever, the final regulations do not interpret the exemption as extend-
ing to subsection 406 (b)(3), which precludes fiduciaries from being
compensated by a party with a plan. 82
There are two primary justifications for the position adopted by
the final regulations. First, although Congress, in drafting ERISA,
was aware of the common practices concerning ESOP loan transac-
tions,3 it broadly stated the exemption in section 408 (b)(3).14 Sec-
ond, the proposed regulations would have rendered the process of
adopting an ESOP too complex and costly,8 especially for a closely-
held corporation. The final regulations should alleviate those prob-
lems while affording adequate protection to the participants. That
assurance is found in the "special scrutiny"" that the federal agen-
cies will employ in evaluating ESOP loan transactions under the
primary benefit requirement.
The Primary Benefit Requirement
An ESOP by its nature 7 requires the plan to secure a lender of
funds and a seller of employer securities. In addition to any benefits
individual participants receive, a corporation is benefited, by the
leveraging of the ESOP. First, it has secured an alternate mode of
corporate finance. Second, the corporate trustee of the plan, if it is
80. Id.
81. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(i), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(a)(1), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44385 (1977).
82. Thus, the final regulations permit a trustee of a close corporation who is a part of
management, and therefore a party-in-interest, to arrange the loan transaction. Likewise, a
corporate trustee acting as the lending institution is no longer precluded from negotiating the
loan terms.
83. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1974), reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5093 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 93-1280].
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3).
85. Regardless of the type of employee benefit plan used, plan administration expenses
often reduce a smaller company's incentive to adopt a plan. Howell, The Spread of Deferred
Profit Sharing to Small Corporations through IRS-Qualified Prototype Plans, in METZGER,
supra note 65, at 593, 594.
86. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(ii), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(a)(1), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44385 (1977).
87. See note 6 supra.
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the lending institution, obtains the interest paid by the plan for the
loan.
A pre-ERISA IRS rulinge held that such incidental benefits re-
ceived by the employer did not violate the primary benefit require-
ment. The proposed regulations, however, broadly mandated that
a loan to an ESOP be made primarily for the benefit of participants
and beneficiaries of the plan. In response to criticism89 of the pro-
posed regulations' lack of guidance, the final regulations specify two
initial tests that will be employed as part of the "special scrutiny"
for primary benefit requirement violations.
First, the "net effect on plan assets" test provides: "At the time
that a loan is made, the interest rate for the loan and the price of
securities to be acquired with the loan proceeds should not be such
that the plan assets might be drained off."90 Like other provisions
of the regulations and the Act," this test is designed to protect
existing assets when the fiduciary attempts to acquire additional
securities. For example, an ESOP's ultimate success is dependent
upon the rate of the securities' appreciation exceeding the interest
rate charged for the loan.2 Consequently, the loan would not be
found to be negotiated for the primary benefit of the participants
where secondary plan assets must be expended for interest pay-
ments. The latter situation would prevail where the interest rate
exceeds the expected rate of appreciation. 3
Second, the "arms length" standard provides: "The terms of a
loan, whether or not between independent parties, must, at the time
the loan is made, be at least as favorable to the ESOP as the terms
of a comparable loan resulting from arms length negotiations be-
88. Rev. Rul. 69-421 pt. 2 § (k)(1), 1969-2 C.B. 59.
89. 42 Fed. Reg. 44384 (1977) (supplementary information to the final regulations).
90. Tress. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(3)(ii), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44389 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(c)(2), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
91. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(7), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977) and 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(g), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977) require that a reasonable rate of interest be
charged for the loan. In an acquisition or sale of stock, an ESOP is not exempt from entering
into a prohibited transaction if less than "adequate consideration" is given or received.
ERISA, § 408(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
92. ESOPs REPOirs, supra note 60, at 24.
93. This could occur even though other provisions governing the reasonableness of the
interest rate or purchase price may not be violated. For instance, an interest rate may be
reasonable when compared with prevailing rates, yet still be too high where the interest rate
exceeds the likely security appreciation. Alternatively, even though the ESOP paid adequate
consideration for the securities and the interest rate was reasonable, the fair market value
might be extremely high, thereby unduly endangering the investment should the value dec-
line. Congress, recognizing that these could be potential problems, recommended that
"special scrutiny" of the transaction be employed to protect the interest of the participants.
H.R. REp. No. 93-1280, supra note 83, at 312.
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tween independent parties."94 This provision extends some guidance
to the fiduciary negotiating the loan terms without imposing the
counterproductive independent fiduciary requirement contained in
the proposed reguations.
The government does not intend to limit application of the pri-
mary benefit requirement to the foregoing tests. The Department of
Labor and the IRS will examine all other "surrounding facts and
circumstances" which indicate that the fiduciary did not act for the
primary benefit of the participants and the beneficiaries." In this
regard, one decision, rendered recently, but prior to the promulga-
tion of the final regulations, required the trustee to give "adequate
attention to or assessment of the effect of those transactions on the
value of the assets of the plan and the interests of plan participants
and beneficiaries." 9 Failure to do so was held to constitute a breach
of a fiduciary duty. This case illustrates that a fiduciary should
determine what beneficial effects, if any, a loan will have for the
plan and the participants before closing the transaction.
Generally, the final regulations appear to strike an admirable
balance. They recognize that the goals of and benefits received by
the employer and the plan participants are not mutually exclusive.
While permitting a loan to an ESOP even where it aids the em-
ployer, the regulations focus the trustees' attention, for purposes of
the primary benefit requirement, upon such factors as the future
economic growth of the company, the loan terms available else-
where, and the stability 7 of the securities' fair market value over
time. In turn, by requiring the trustee to evaluate the employer and
the loan in light of external circumstances, they may increase plan
costs by motivating the trustee to seek independent counseling.
However, these costs may be minimal in light of the already wide-
spread practice of consulting investment counselors. Additionally,
they are probably offset by the benefits made possible by the loan.
Collateral and Release from Encumbrance
If collateral is to be given to a party-in-interest to secure a loan,
94. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(3)(iii), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(c)(3), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
95. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(3)(i), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(c)(1), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
96. Eaves v. Penn., 426 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (applying the net effect test to
an entire transaction).
97. Such stability may indicate a minimal risk that the price of the security will subse-
quently fall.
98. A 1969 study reports that 66% of the companies with profit-sharing plans employ
professional consultants to guide their fund investments. MMrZGM, supra note 65, at 152.
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section 408 (b)(3) of the Act 9 mandates that only qualifying em-
ployer securities may be posted for that purpose. The final regula-
tions clarify this requirement. 0 To be an exempt loan, the loan
documents must not permit recourse against the ESOP in case of
default in repayment of the loan. The only ESOP assets that may
be used as collateral are the qualifying employer's securities either
acquired with the proceeds of the loan or those given as collateral
for a prior exempt loan that was repaid with the proceeds of the
current exempt loan. The fiduciary or trustee may retire the debt
with collateral given for the loan, employer contributions (non-
securities) to meet loan obligations, and earnings attributable to
such collateral and investments of such contributions. While a loan
debt is outstanding, the plan's books of accounts must separately
provide for the aforementioned earnings and contributions. Also,
while .a loan is unpaid, the acquired securities are considered en-
cumbered'0 1 and must be placed in a suspense account. 2
The final regulations0 3 are significantly less rigid than the pro-
posed regulations' 4 in that the trustee is not required to release the
securities from encumbrance in equal annual amounts. 05 Instead,
the final regulations permit release of securities from encumbrance
as principal and interest are paid.10s However, the regulations cau-
99. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3).
100. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(5), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(e), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
101. "Encumbrance" refers to those securities held as collateral for the loan. Treas. Reg.
§ 54.4975-7(b)(8), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3(h), 42 Fed. Reg.
44384, 44386 (1977).
102. A suspense account contains encumbered securities not yet allocable to individual
accounts.
103. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(h), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
104. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(iii)(C), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31835 (1976); Prop.
Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(3)(iii), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31873 (1976).
105. Congress found that the equal annual contributions and the release from the sus-
pense account did not conform with common business practices. CONFERENCE RE'ORT No. 94-
1515, supra note 21, at 540. See also 122 CONG. REc. S13429, S13431 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976)
(critique submitted for the record by Sen. Stevens criticizing the proposed regulations).
Unequal payments might be made through a money purchase plan, using a fixed formula to
determine the amount of the annual contribution and, ultimately, the release from encumbr-
ance.
106. The regulations provide the following example:
Corporation X establishes an ESOP that borrows $750,000 from a bank. X guaran-
tees the loan which is for 15 years at 5% interest and is payable in level annual
amounts of $72,256.72. Total payments on the loan are $1,083,850.80. The ESOP
uses the entire loan proceeds to acquire 15,000 shares of X stock which is used as
collateral for the loan. The number of securities to be released for the first year is
1000 shares, i.e., 15,000 shares x $72,256.72/$1,083,850.80 = 15,000 shares x 1/15.
The number of securities to be released for the second year is 1000 shares, i.e.,
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tion against the possibility of exceeding the general ERISA maxi-
mum annual additions' 7 to the participants' individual accounts.0 8
Consequently, while release of the securities in varying amounts is
permitted, the IRS warns that such transactions will be observed
closely to guarantee that the employer is making the required' 9
substantial and recurring contributions to the ESOP."0 The change
in the regulations reflects the money purchase plans' current prac-
tice of determining the annual employer contribution according to
a fixed formula, which, depending on the factors taken into account,
may result in different amounts from year to year. Contributions in
varying amounts will permit the ESOP to promote employee incen-
tive and to reward increased employee productivity.
Default
Although the proposed regulations limited the transfer of plan
assets in the event of default by an ESOP for the amounts necessary
to meet loan payments,"' the final regulations"' are more permis-
sive. The general rule regarding default is that the value of plan
assets transferred to the lender must not exceed the amount of the
default. However, where the "lender" is a party-in-interest,"I3 the
final regulations limit "default" to the extent that a plan fails to
meet the payment schedule for the loan. Securities serving as collat-
eral for the balance of the loan are not immediately forfeited. But,
since the term "lender" is defined to exclude a party-in-interest who
merely guarantees the loan to the ESOP, only credit extended in
other forms will trigger the latter more restrictive limitation.
The final regulations increase the likelihood that a given plan will
be able to obtain a loan. Lending institutions will now extend credit
more readily to ESOPs since the lender generally will not be re-
14,000 x $72,256.72/$1,011,594.08 = 14,000 shares x 1/14. If all loan payments are
made as originally scheduled, the number of securities released in each succeeding
year of the loan will also be 1000.
Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8)(iv), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-
3(h) (iv), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
107. I.R.C. § 415(c) imposes a limit on the annual additions to the individual account of
the lesser of $25,000 or 25% of the participant's compensation.
108. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8)(iii), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(h)(3), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1972).
110. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8)(iii), 42 Fed. Reg. 44389, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(h)(3), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
111. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(D), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31835(1976); Prop. Labor
Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(iv), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31872 (1976)..
112. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(6), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(f), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
113. Id.
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quired to engage in overly expensive and time-consuming machina-
tions to recover the funds advanced to the plan. Concurrently, the
participants will be protected in those situations where a party-in-
interest extends a questionable form of credit without assuming
primary liability in the case of default. This procedure should strike
a balance which promotes sound lending practices commensurate
with the free adoption of ESOPs.
Use of Loan Proceeds and Type of Stock
ERISA defines "qualifying employer securities" '  as employer
securities which are either stock or marketable obligations. 115 A
"marketable obligation" is defined as a bond, debenture, note or
certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness."' The proposed regu-
lations," 7 in essence, required the ESOP to acquire common stock
with unrestricted voting and dividend rights. Non-voting common
or preferred stock could be acquired only if the stock complied with
additional, more restrictive, limitations."8 Other limitations per-
tained to options such as puts or calls,"9 and buy-sell arrange-
ments. 10 These severe restrictions were justly criticized as rendering
the administration of ESOPs unduly complex.
The final regulations require that exempt loan proceeds be
used, '' within a reasonable time after their receipt, only for the
acquisition of qualifying employer securities, 2 or the repayment of
the principal of a present or a prior exempt loan. 23 Though the final
114. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
115. ERISA, § 407(d)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(5) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C.
§ 4975(e)(8).
116. Id. § 407(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(e); ERISA, § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 503(e).
117. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(B)(2), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31834 (1976); Prop.
Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(ii)(C), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31872 (1976).
118. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(B)(3), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31835 (1976); Prop.
Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(ii)(C), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31872 (1976).
119. These are rights to either sell (in the case of puts) or buy (in the case of calls) within
a given time and for a given price.
120. These are agreements whereby a corporation or other shareholder agrees to buy
another shareholder's stock on the happening of a certain event, e.g., death of the shareholder.
121. Compare Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(5), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977) and 29
C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3(d), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977) with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-
7(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)-(5), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31834 (1976) and Prop. Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-
3(b)(i)(2)(B) through (F), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31871-72 (1976). See also [19761 4 PENS. PLAN
GUIDE (CCH) 25,133 (summary of public comments); 122 CONG. REc. S13429 (daily ed. Aug.
4, 1976) (criticism offered by Sen. Stevens); Note, Recent Developments in Employee Stock
Ownership Plans, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 709, 729-33 (1977).
122. For permissible restrictions on securities, see text accompanying notes 140-55 infra
(put options and rights of first refusal).
123. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(4), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3(d), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977). Occasionally an ESOP purchases life insur-
ance on a key shareholder in order to purchase his shares from his estate at the time of death.
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regulations deleted many of the limitations contained in the pro-
posed regulations, the Department of Labor and the IRS have ex-
pressed 2 1 continued concern regarding the nature of securities ac-
quired with exempt ESOP loan proceeds: a trustee who acquires
securities for an ESOP with exempt loan proceeds remains subject
to the general fiduciary duty found in section 404 (a)(1) of the Act.' 25
As noted above, the original regulations would have required that
essentially all stock acquired with exempt loan proceeds have voting
rights' 21 and that those rights "pass-through" in a manner enabling
the individual participant to exercise them. l2 One commentator
objected to the proposed regulation, arguing that corporate manage-
ment would become impossible if every participant had a voting
right. '28 The duty to notify participants of every voting issue pending
would have been extremely burdensome. Apparently, the proposed
regulations intended to protect participants from a corporation's
issuance of worthless stock. However, Congress, in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 Conference Committee Report, recognized that non-
leveraged ESOPs, i.e., certain stock bonus plans, are not required
to pass voting rights through to participants, 9 and concluded that
the regulations should not distinguish between these types of plans
in the proposed manner.
As a result, the absolute requirement that all ESOP-acquired
securities carry voting rights was deleted in the final regulations. 30
However, while one might assume that the deletion of the voting
rights requirement permits an ESOP fiduciary to acquire all non-
voting stock, the fiduciary nevertheless remains subject to the sec-
tion 404 (a)(1)' 31 duty to administer the plan solely in the interests
of the participants and the beneficiaries. He must acquire stock
with rights and features sufficient to permit him to provide partici-
pants with full benefits and to protect the value of current invest-
An ESOP, just as any other stock bonus plan, may invest in insurance policies so long as the
"exclusive benefit" requirement of I.R.C. § 401 (a) is met. However, an ESOP loan will not
be exempt if the loan proceeds are used to acquire the life insurance policies. 42 Fed. Reg.
44388, 44390 (1977) (supplemental information to the final regulations).
124. 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44389 (1977) (supplemental information to the final regulations).
125. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(B)(2), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31834 (1976); Prop.
Labor Reg. § 2550.508b-3 (b)(1)(ii)(B), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31871 (1976).
127. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (d)(2), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31837 (1976).
128. [19761 4 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,133, at 27,200 (comment by Richard Ivester).
129. CONFERENCE REPORT No. 94-1515, supra note 21, at 540.
130. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(5), 42 Fed. Reg. 44389, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.508b-3 (d), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44386 (1977).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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ments.'32 To fulfill this duty, it may, in certain circumstances, 33 be
necessary for the stock to carry voting rights. In fact, a 1969 study
revealed that over ninety percent of the profit-sharing trusts that
invested in employer securities held voting stock.'34
Even where voting rights accompany the stock acquired by the
ESOP, there remains the issue of how they are to be exercised. The
primary alternatives in this regard include passing voting rights
through to the employees, permitting a plan fiduciary to exercise
the voting rights in his sole discretion, or requiring the rights be
exercised by a fiduciary only after consultation with a participant
advisory board.' 35 Although the final regulations do not require vot-
ing rights to pass through to the participants, it has been suggested
that since the participants share the risk of ownership, voting rights
on the stock held by the trust should be passed through. 3M This
would be consistent with what some commentators assert is the
primary justification for ESOPs: allowing the participant to share
fully in capital ownership.' 31 It would also avoid the potentially
problematical voting of the stock by an ESOP trustee who is con-
trolled by the management or board of directors of the corporate
employer.' 38 However, prior custom in this regard has been varied
and generally has not included a pass-through provision.
39
132. I.R.S., Technical Information Release 1413, F-3 (1975), with regard to ESOPs under
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRASOPs), provides that:
An ESOP under section 301(d) of the Act, . . . must be funded by (1) common
stock issued by the employer or a corporation which is in control of the employer
... with voting power and dividend rights no less favorable than the voting power
and dividend rights of other common stock issued by the employer or such control-
ling corporation or (2) securities issued by these corporations which are immedi-
ately convertible at a reasonable conversion ratio into such stock by employees, to
whose accounts the securities are allocated.
133. Such circumstances may involve the possible acquisition of worthless stock.
134. METZGER, supra note 65, at 335. Eighty percent of the ESOPs in another survey held
securities with voting rights. ESOPs REPORT, supra note 60, at 48.
135. METZGER, supra note 65, at 335. PROFIT SHARING, supra note 60, at 36.
136. [19761 4 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,051, at 27,110 (testimony of Mr. Richard A.
Fay before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on December 11 and 12, 1975); Note,
Employee Stock Ownership Plan: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 55 B.U. L. REV.
195, 221-23 (1975).
137. See ScHARF, supra note 7.
138. Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 55
B.U. L. REv. 195, 221-22 (1975).
139. Voting rights were exercised by corporate trustees or by parties within the company
44.5% and 42.4% of the time, respectively. In only 7.2% of the time did employees vote their
stock. MErZGE, supra note 65, at 335. However, regarding profit sharing trusts established
by large companies, it has been found that substantially more employees are allowed to
exercise the stock voting rights. In a survey of thirty-five trusts holding employer securities,
42.9% had pass-through voting rights while corporate or individual trustees exercised the
right in 51.5%. Profit sharing committees directed the trustee how to vote in 2.8%. PROFIT
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Whether or not the purpose of an ESOP is to increase employee
input into managerial determinations must be decided on an indivi-
dualized basis. An ESOP for a closely-held corporation need not be
created for this purpose, since participant economic benefits, work
incentives, and tax advantages provide sufficient reasons to estab-
lish an ESOP. While philosophical and ideological considerations
may indicate the desirability of passing voting rights through, such
a change in social policy should not be mandated by governmental
regulations. The final regulations, by deleting this requirement, pro-
perly leave the development of social policy to the private sector.
Moreover, where the right to vote stock is given solely to a fiduciary,
the exercise of that right must be tempered by his fiduciary duty of
increasing the economic value of the ESOP's investment assets.
Put Option Rights
The proposed regulations would have also required that all
ESOP-acquired employer securities carry the right to "put" the
securities back to the employer at the participant's option." 0 Addi-
tionally, exercise of the put option would have required the em-
ployer to immediately honor the obligation in full. Two primary
objections were raised against these requirements. First, under some
state laws a corporation may not purchase its own stock, and certain
corporations, such as commercial banks and other financial institu-
tions, may not issue put options. Second, the requirement of full
and immediate payment upon exercise of a put option could se-
verely limit an employer's cash flow. Both concerns might have
resulted in significant impediments to the adoption of ESOPs. The
final regulations, however, represent a meaningful response to these
criticisms.
Qualifying employer securities acquired "' with exempt loan pro-
ceeds must be subject to a put option if the securities are either not
publicly traded when distributed or if they are publicly traded but
are subject "2 to a trading limitation when distributed.' Thus, the
SHARING, supra note 60, at 36. This suggests that smaller companies that may be closely-held
are generally opposed to pass-through voting rights.
140. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(i)(B)(6), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31835 (1976); Prop.
Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(ii)(F), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31872 (1976). Upon distribution,
the stock may not be of any benefit to the participant unless he can convert it into cash.
141. The requirement applies to securities acquired after September 30, 1976. Treas. Reg.
§ 54.5975-7 (b)(10), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3 (j), 42 Fed.
Reg. 44384, 44387 (1977).
142. If the security becomes subject to a trading limitation within fifteen months after
its distribution to a participant the employee must notify the security holder that such a
limitation exists and that, for the balance of the fifteen month period, the securities are
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final regulations assure a market for the securities of a closely-held
corporation' without unduly restricting incentive to adopt ESOPs.
Further, the changes in the final regulations conform to the realities
of state law and corporate finance.'45 If state or federal law prohibits
an employer from honoring a put option, the plan must permit the
security to be put to a third party'45 having substantial net worth
at the time of the loan and whose net worth may be reasonably
expected to remain so. Although the ESOP may never be bound by
a put option, the option may grant the ESOP the opportunity to
assume the rights and obligations of the employer at or after the
time the option is exercised. Buy-sell arrangements are barred. Gen-
erally, 47 the option must exist for fifteen months starting from the
date of distribution to the participant from the ESOP. Payment
provisions upon exercise of the option must be reasonable.' 8 For
example, payment may be made in installments over a maximum
five-year period from the time the option is exercised provided the
annual installments are substantially equal.'49 Periodic payments
are designed to encourage stable capital formation for the company
while permitting the participant to convert his stock holdings to
cash within a reasonable time. The final regulations adopt a realis-
tic approach regarding put option rights.
subject to a put option. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(11)(ii), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977);
29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3 (k), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44387 (1977).
143. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(10), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3 (j), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44387 (1977). The concept of 'publicly traded' is expanded
under Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(1)(iv), 42 Fed. Reg. 44389, 44391 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.508b-3 (a)(4), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44385 (1977), to encompass both securities listed on a
national securities exchange registered under § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78 f (1970), and those quoted on a system sponsored by a national securities associa-
tion registered under § 15 A (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1970). This has the
effect of limiting the extent to which a put option is required.
144. If a plan has acquired publicly-held securities, no trading limitations exist and a put
option is not required.
145. This problem was noted in the CONFERENCE REPORT No. 94-1515, supra note 21, at
541.
146. The third party may, for example, be an affiliate of the employer or a shareholder
other than the ESOP.
147. The duration of the put option may be longer than fifteen months. However, it may
not include a period in which the party bound by the put option is prohibited from honoring
it because of state or federal law.
148. Deferred payments are reasonable if adequate security and a reasonable rate of
interest are provided for any credit extended by the participant. The cumulative payment
should not be less than the aggregate of the periodic payments. Periodic payments are reason-
able if the annual installments are substantially equal. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(12)(iv),
42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3(1)(4), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44387
(1977).
149. The installment period may be extended to the earlier of 10 years from the date the
put option was exercised or the date of repayment of the loan used to purchase the security
subject to the put option.
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Right of First Refusal
The proposed regulations' ban on an employer's or shareholder's
reservation of a right of first refusal 5 ° evoked particularly strong
criticism. Small businessmen complained that unless they were per-
mitted to retain control of their companies through the right of first
refusal, they would have to abandon the use of ESOPs.' 5' Congress
also recommended that ESOPs be permitted to acquire securities
subject to such a right.'52
Consequently, the final regulations'53 generally permit acquisition
of securities subject to a first refusal provision with regard to certain
types of securities.' 5 ' The right of first refusal may lie only in favor
of the employer, the ESOP, or both, and must lapse after a period
of fourteen days following written notification by the security
holder. The selling price must be no less than the greater of either
the fair market value of the securities 5 or the purchase price and
other terms offered by a third party buyer bidding in good faith.
The final regulations are primarily advantageous to a closely-held
company where investors are interested in maintaining control of
the company. Securities acquired with this limitation do not hinder
a fiduciary in fulfilling his obligations to the participants and the
beneficiaries. The inclusion of this permissive provision removes a
potential disincentive for a closely-held corporation to adopt an
ESOP.
Valuations
The final regulations'56 specify guidelines for determining the
value of securities at the time a put option is exercised'57 as well as
upon notification regarding a right of first refusal.'5 More impor-
tantly, to qualify an initial acquisition or a subsequent sale of the
securities for the section 408 (e) 5 prohibited transactions exemp-
150. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(ii), 41 Fed. Reg. 31833, 31834 (1976);
Prop. Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3 (b)(1)(ii)(A)(2), 41 Fed. Reg. 31870, 31871 (1976).
151. [1976] 4 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,133, at 27,200 (comments by John C.
Hough).
152. CONFERENCE REPORT No. 94-1515, supra note 21, at 541.
153. Treas. Reg. § 54.4972-7 (b)(9), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3 (i), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44387 (1977).
154.. The securities may not be publicly traded and must be stock or an equity security,
or a debt security convertible into stock or equitable security.
155. See text accompanying notes 163-64 infra.
156. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (d)(5), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44394 (1977).
157. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(12), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3 (1), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44387 (1977).
158. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(9), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-3 (1), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44387 (1977).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (e) (Supp. V 1975).
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tion, the acquisition or sale of securities must be for "adequate
consideration."' "0 In the event that less than adequate consideration
is received by an ESOP, the IRS has authority to impose an excise
tax on the amount involved' with respect to the prohibited transac-
tion. "2
Adequate consideration for securities with a generally recognized
market is the prevailing price on a national securities exchange, or
if traded over the counter, the offering price as established by cur-
rent bids and asked prices of persons independent of the issuer or
party-in-interest. 63 If the asset is a security without a generally
recognized market, i.e., securities of a closely-held corporation, the
fair market value of the assets is to be determined in good faith by
a trustee or fiduciary. 164
To substantially minimize the excise tax on the amount involved
in the event that a prohibited transaction is made and the ESOP
receives less value than it paid, the trustee or named fiduciary must
make a good faith effort to determine the fair market value. 65 The
amount involved is then limited to the excess of the fair market
value of the property transferred by the ESOP over the amount it
received, 66 and any excise tax is imposed on this amount if the
prohibited transaction is timely corrected. 7
160. In addition, ERISA, § 408 (e)(2), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (e)(2)(3) (Supp. V 1975),
require that no commission be charged for the sale or acquisition, and that the sale be to an
individual account plan or not prohibited by § 407 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
161. ERISA, § 2003 (a), I.R.C. § 4975 (f)(4) states in part, that "amount involved" means
the greater of the amount of money and the fair market value of the other property either
given or received. Regarding the definition of the amount involved, Temp. Treas. Reg. §
141.4975-13 (1976) adopted the provisions of Treas. Reg. § 53.4941 (e)-1 (1973) (relating to
prohibited transactions and private foundations) until final regulations under I.R.C. § 4975
(e) are issued.
162. ERISA, § 2003 (a), I.R.C. § 4975 (a) imposes an excise tax of five percent of the
amount involved. Subsection (b) imposes a tax of 100% of the amount involved if the prohib-
ited transaction is not corrected within ninety days after notification of the original defi-
ciency.
163. ERISA, § 3 (18)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (18)(A) (Supp. V 1975). While no regulations
have been issued under this section, regulations found under similar statutory language in
I.R.C. § 503 (e)(1)(A) may provide guidance as to the proper method of valuation. See, e.g.,
Treas. Reg. § 1.503 (e)-2 (1976). C. SANDS, 3 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 66.03
(4th ed. 1974). Those methods are designed to determine the price accurately reflecting the
market value of the obligation.
164. ERISA, § 3 (18)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (18)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
165. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941 (e)-1 (1973). See note 161 supra.
166. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941 (e)-1 (b)(2)(iii) (1973). See note 161 supra.
167. If corrected, the excise tax would be five percent of the limited amount involved
instead of five percent of the full value of the property acquired. ERISA, § 2003 (e), I.R.C. §
4975 (a). Under ERISA, § 2003 (a), I.R.C. 4975 (f)(5), correction requires "undoing the
[prohibited] transaction to the extent possible" or "placing the plan in a financial position
not worse than if the prohibited transaction had not occurred. If the trustee pursues good faith
ESOP Loan Transactions
Good faith, in this regard, requires that an independent person,
who is competent, make the valuation, utilizing methods generally
accepted in arm's length business transactions for valuing compara-
ble assets.'68 The final regulations eliminate the requirement of fil-
ing an annual certificate of valuation with the IRS.' 5 This alleviates
the burden of the potentially high valuation certification, and filing
costs complained of at least by smaller companies. While an annual
certificate of valuation is not needed, a valuation must be made as
of the date of the transaction if the transaction is made between a
plan and a disqualified party.'7 ° In all other cases, the most recent
valuation date under the plan documents will be sufficient.
The regulations add that valuations must be made in good faith
and be based on all relevant factors for determining the fair market
value of the securities.' 7 ' For a closely-held company, the methods
in valuing stock are similar as those for estate tax purposes.', A 1959
revenue ruling,' 3 apparently still valid although, by its terms, appl-
icable to estate and gift tax valuation, instructs the trustee to look
to the nature of the business and its financial history. Other subjects
for examination include the industry's outlook, the employer's po-
tential growth rate, the stock's book value, the employer's current
financial condition, and the employer's earnings and dividend ca-
pacities.
The fiduciary must exercise caution in fulfilling the good faith
valuation requirement. Where the transaction is between a plan and
a disqualified person,'74 even an appraisal by an independent entity
may not be conclusive of good faith.'75 However, in other cases such
a precaution will be conclusive. Fund evaluations or investment
audits are a common practice and have been used with increasing
frequency.'76 Although such an audit may be costly, it minimizes the
risk of imprudent investment.' An investment audit should deter-
efforts in valuing the assets, rescission will be avoided as a possible corrective measure."
Treas. Reg. 53.4941 (e)-l(c)(7) (1973). See note 161 supra.
168. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941 (e)-l(b)(2)(iii)(b) (1973). See note 161 supra. Treas. Reg. §
54.4975-7 (b)(12), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1977); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3 (1), 42 Fed. Reg.
44384, 44387 (1977); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7 (b)(9), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44392 (1971); 29
C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3 (i), 42 Fed. Reg. 44384, 44387 (1977).
169. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (d)(5), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44394 (1977).
170. Id.
171." Id.
172. See SCHARF, note 7 supra.
173. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
174. A disqualified person is in effect a party-in-interest. Compare ERISA, § 2003 (a),
I.R.C. § 4975 (e)(2) with ERISA, § 3 (14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (14) (Supp. V 1975).
175. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (d)(5), 42 Fed. Reg. 44388, 44384 (1977).
176. M GrzER, note 65 supra, at 547.
177. Clemens, "The Investment Audit," in METZGER, note 65 supra, at 547.
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mine whether the purposes of the ESOP's adoption and the invest-
ment objectives are properly, defined, whether the investment plan
is designed to accomplish these objectives in a manner consistent
with ERISA, the regulations, and sound investment principles, and
whether the trustee has considered the merits of the investment
independent of any benefit to a party-in-interest.
CONCLUSION
The final regulations attempt to provide that an ESOP trustee
engage in loan transactions primarily benefiting the plan's partici-
pants and beneficiaries. Deletions from the final regulations of pro-
visions such as the independent fiduciary requirement, the restric-
tions on the type of employer securities acquired, the annual certifi-
cate of valuation, and right of first refusal prohibition make ESOPs
more attractive from the employer's point of view. Unfortunately,
although the regulations do not specifically require acquired stock
to have voting rights, agencies have not addressed the extent to
which they may invoke the section 404 fiduciary duties and require
certain stock to have voting rights. Until the point is settled, a
fiduciary should closely examine the importance voting rights have
to the plan's objectives.
On balance, under the final regulations, fiduciaries should find
the administration of ESOPs much simpler than it would have been
under the proposed regulations. However, while the increase in the
flexibility of arranging loan transactions may reduce the risk of
liability for breaching a fiduciary duty, the actual administration of
the ESOP must comply with the high fiduciary standards that oth-
erwise exist under ERISA. Thus, the participants are not likely to
suffer, and, to the extent that the final regulations encourage the use
of ESOPs, they will gain the benefits that ESOPs afford.
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